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In recent work Sperber and Wilson expand on ideas initially presented in 
Relevance (1986) and fl esh out continuua between showing and mean-
ing, and determinate and indeterminate content. Drawing on Sperber 
and Wilson’s work, and at points defending it from what I see as poten-
tial objections, I present a Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA) that 
includes an additional third continuum between linguistic and non-lin-
guistic content. The SCA clears the way for consideration of what exactly 
is meant by showing, the motivations of speakers, how affect impacts 
expression, and metaphor. The SCA allows us to consider not only how 
but why we engage in certain forms of communicative behavior, and 
captures the incredible nuance of human interactions: said and meant, 
linguistic and non-linguistic, determinate and indeterminate.
Keywords: Sperber and Wilson, Grice, meaning, showing, deter-
minate, indeterminate, linguistic, non-linguistic, metaphor, affect.
1. Introduction
Every philosophy of language is distinguished not just by its theoreti-
cal core but by the sorts of cases that it considers for explanation. The 
pragmatic tradition, which includes work by philosophers such as H. P. 
Grice, Dan Sperber, and Deirdre Wilson, stands apart from predeces-
sors in part because of engagement with how we actually use language, 
“in the wild”—with meanings and to achieve aims that are not explicit-
ly stated, but suggested or implicated. Language is not best understood 
in terms of coding meanings, as Sperber and Wilson convincingly argue 
in the introduction to their 1986 book Relevance, but on a continuum 
with other communicative acts.
The work of Sperber and Wilson builds on the tradition Grice began 
in the 1950s. In work published in a 2015 edition of the Croatian Jour-
nal of Philosophy Sperber and Wilson expand on some ideas initially 
presented in Relevance. In (2015) paper Sperber and Wilson expand 
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their theory to explicitly consider cases of meaning as well as showing, 
and discuss acts with determinate as well as indeterminate content. 
Sperber and Wilson’s work is remarkable for its willingness to explain 
acts not just of ordinary utterances but also “ostensive” acts such as 
sniffi ng the seaside in a way that makes it clear the sniffer is “sharing 
an impression” with her audience.
In this same spirit, I expand further on the account presented by 
Sperber and Wilson, and defend it from what I see as a possible miscon-
strual of their view. The theoretical framework presented by Sperber 
and Wilson brings to light some important questions for their account: 
What does the distinction between meaning and showing amount to? Is 
this distinction tantamount to a distinction between expressing content 
linguistically or non-linguistically? Why do we in some circumstances 
mean/state propositions and why in others do we show evidence? Is 
this a conscious decision? What is the relationship between conscious 
awareness and meaning/showing more broadly? I will respond to these 
questions and will consider a number of communicative acts that go 
beyond the sorts of cases that are ordinarily considered by philosophers 
of language—such as utterances that express affective states. I argue 
that with the clarifi cations I propose the Sperber and Wilson account 
has the latitude to account for such acts.
2. Gricean intentions
Grice’s theory of speaker meaning is known to be complex. As charac-
terized by Sperber and Wilson (2015), on Grice’s view:
In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the 
addressee,
 1) to produce a particular response r
 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1) 
 3) to fulfi l (1) on the basis of his fulfi lment of (2) (118) 
What is important about Grice’s view is the way that meaning may go 
beyond the literal words uttered. For example, consider a scenario in 
which someone taps the person in the row in front of them at the the-
ater and utters
(A) “I cannot see over your hat”.
It would be surprising if the person in the hat simply said “Oh I am 
sorry to hear that, but thanks for letting me know”, and turned back 
around in their seat. The fi rst speaker was not intending to simply 
inform the hat-wearer of a fact. Here the intended response—which 
will be readily available to any competent hearer—is the hearer will 
remove his or her hat. It is by the hearer recognizing that this is what 
the utterer intends that the hearer will remove his or her hat. That is, 
to put it in terms of Grice’s view as stated above, the hearer will (2) rec-
ognize that the speaker intends to get the hearer (1) to remove the hat 
and will (3) fulfi ll the request (1), removing the hat, on the basis of the 
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fulfi llment of (2), the recognition of that intention. This sounds complex 
but any witness to the exchange would expect the hearer to remove his 
or her hat, an expectation that demonstrates an understanding of such 
an intention on the part of the speaker.
The complexity of Grice’s proposal has led to criticisms. Jennifer 
Hornsby, for example, writes the following of Grice’s theory:
I think that this ought to seem ludicrous. Real people regularly get things 
across with their utterances; but real people do not regularly possess, still 
less act upon, intentions of this sort...notice that an enormous amount 
would be demanded of hearers, as well as speakers, if such complex inten-
tions really were needed to say things. (Hornsby 2000: 95)
The complexity of the Gricean account does raise questions. Are we 
supposed to spell out all the intentions required for speaker meaning in 
our head? If so, need we be conscious of doing this? Wouldn’t that take 
a long time? If not, in virtue of what can it be said that some speaker 
really has such an intention? Or, to put it in Gricean terms, can there 
be unconscious m-intentions?
Further complicating things are a number of familiar cases where it 
seems any relevant intention would need to be more elaborate than the 
hat case. Metaphors such as,
(B) “Juliet is the sun”
might be taken to express a range of propositions, but not including 
that Juliet is a giant ball of gas. Must a speaker have intended all of 
the acceptable propositions the metaphor can be said to express? Is it 
that intention in virtue of which they are acceptable? If not, what is the 
reason for their acceptability?
One case Grice considers is the letter of recommendation example, 
where an utterer conveys that a job candidate, Mr. X, is no good by 
writing a very short letter of recommendation stating simply that the 
candidate is on time and is a competent speaker of English (Grice 1989: 
33). In this example, the speaker fl outs the maxim of quantity to com-
municate by conversational implicature (Grice 1989: 33). There are 
other cases, of a sort that Grice does not consider, where an attitude is 
conveyed, but it is not by means of conversational implicature (which 
requires intentional fl outing on the part of the speaker).
Slips of the tongue do not fall neatly within the Gricean picture. 
Consider the following example from Davidson,
(C) ‘We are all cremated equal’ (Davidson 2006: 251).
Are we justifi ed in coming to the conclusion that this speaker meant 
something about death? Or should we say instead that they intended 
to say ‘created’—not ‘cremated’—and thus ignore what seems to be re-
vealed through the utterance?
The following case, in which the speaker reveals a negative atti-
tude, is from István Kecskés,
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(D) Roy: Are you okay?
 Mary: I’m fi ne, Roy.
 Roy: I would have believed you if you hadn’t said ‘Roy’.
 (Kecskes 2014: 2016)
A profi cient speaker will recognize that Mary is not fi ne. As Kecskés 
draws attention to with this example, there is something about stating 
someone’s name at the end of such a sentence that expresses displea-
sure. A noteworthy thing about this case is that it may or may not have 
been Mary’s intention to convey her displeasure here. In fact, Mary’s 
intention is not relevant to the determination that the speaker is not 
fi ne. This means that this content is expressed by a means other than 
Gricean implicature of the sort that follows the three-pronged frame-
work, as illustrated by case A.
Case D is one that ordinary hearers can pick up on. There are also 
cases where some expressed content requires a more trained hearer 
to pick up on. The following is taken taken from Bezuidenhout (2001), 
who is expanding on Stern (2000)
(E) A young woman Marie, who is in psychotherapy because she 
is suffering from anorexia nervosa, tells her therapist that her 
mother has forbidden her to see her boyfriend. Referring to her 
mother’s injunction, Marie utters:
 [1] I won’t swallow that
 Here ‘swallow’ is being used metaphorically, and Stern suggests 
that the content of Marie’s utterance (the proposition she ex-
pressed) can be paraphrased as
 [2] Marie won’t accept her mother’s injunction.
 Given her eating disorder, it seems signifi cant that Marie chose 
to frame her comment about her mother’s injunction by using 
the word ‘swallow’. But once we’ve accessed the metaphorical 
interpretation it seems that we’ve lost the echoes of meaning 
that might connect what she is saying to her eating disorder and 
hence to any problems that she might be having with her mother 
connected to this disorder. (Bezuidenhout 2001: 33–34)
As Bezuidenhout points out in this passage if we interpret metaphors 
in terms of their literal content then we miss out on shades of mean-
ing that seem to be conveyed by the specifi cs of the metaphor used. 
Do we need a theory that allows us to say that Marie really did mean 
something about her eating disorder here, although she may not have 
consciously intended it? Again, if she did mean something about her 
mother’s eating disorder, it is not because of a complex three-pronged 
Gricean intention. Indeed, it is precisely her lack of awareness of this 
connection that a skilled therapist would work to identify and point 
out to her.
Cases B–E are the sort that can prove problematic for any philoso-
phy of language. Metaphor, as in case B, has received a great deal of 
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attention in the literature, and slips of the tongue have received a fair 
amount. Less present in the analytic, and certainly Gricean literature, 
is consideration of cases such as D and E. I will return to consider 
these cases in a later section. I will approach them as a part of my pro-
posed Schema of Communicative Acts, which will build on the work of 
Sperber and Wilson. Before we can get to that point I will present the 
Sperber and Wilson account.
3. Sperber and Wilson’s proposal
In their 2015 paper “Beyond Speaker’s Meaning” Sperber and Wilson 
present new applications for their notion of ostensive-inferential com-
munication that go beyond what is normally taken as the purview of 
philosophy of language. Ostensive-inferential communication makes 
use of just the fi rst two conditions of Grice’s theory of speaker mean-
ing; Sperber and Wilson write that is more “conceptually unifi ed” and 
“does a better job of explaining how utterances are interpreted than a 
standard Gricean approach” (117).
On the Sperber and Wilson ostensive-inferential view, in order to 
mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee,
1) to produce a particular response r
2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)
Note here that the third Gricean condition has been dropped. Sper-
ber and Wilson explain their dropping the third clause in the following 
way:
In characterising ostensive communication, we built on the fi rst two clauses 
of Grice’s defi nition and dropped the third…because it seemed obvious that 
there is a continuum of cases between ‘meaning that’ (typically achieved by 
the use of language) and displaying evidence that (in other words, showing) 
and we wanted our account of communication to cover both. (119)
Sperber and Wilson believe that by dropping the third clause—that 
the recognition of the speaker’s intention be the basis for a hearer to 
produce some response—their account covers not only ‘meaning that’ 
but ‘showing that’.
The central component of the Sperber and Wilson theory—Rel-
evance Theory—is the presumption of relevance. The presumption of 
relevance is, roughly, the idea that when someone makes an utterance 
we assume that they have deemed it to be relevant to the conversation, 
and this knowledge helps us interpret it (Sperber and Wilson 1986). 
Relevance is one of Grice’s four conversational maxims of quantity, 
quality, relation and manner, which for Grice interact, and the uphold-
ing of one often explains why another is violated (Grice 1989; Johnson 
2016). In a nutshell of Sperber and Wilson’s theory is that relevance 
alone can do the work that Grice divided into the four maxims. Osten-
sive-inferential communication is communication that a speaker has 
deemed relevant.
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In both the Sperber and Wilson and the Grice characterization, a 
meaningful utterance is made to “produce a particular response r” in 
the hearer. This response can be 1) performing a physical action, such 
as removing a hat, or going away (Grice 1989: 96), or 2) simply com-
ing to have a mental state, such as believing a certain proposition. In 
other words, the Gricean and Sperber and Wilson accounts can be un-
derstood as ways to get others to respond—be that by believing certain 
things or behaving in certain ways.
Sperber and Wilson go on to consider examples such as ‘Juliet is the 
sun’ (2015: 120). Such cases lead Sperber and Wilson to add to their 
fi rst distinction between showing and meaning—as follows from their 
dropping of Grice’s third clause—with a second distinction, between 
cases with more or less determinate meaning. A continuum along this 
distinction is mapped onto the fi rst continuum. They end up with a 
plane that looks like this:
From here Sperber and Wilson proceed to give examples of utterances 
or behaviors that fall on each of these nine points. These are presented 
below, beginning with determinate content that is on different points 
of the meaning-showing continuum (F–H below).
(F)   
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(G)   
(H)   
From Sperber and Wilson they present three cases that are between 
determinate and indeterminate content, and across the meaning-show-
ing continuum (I–K).
(I)   
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(J)   
(K)   
And lastly, we are presented with indeterminate content, across the 
meaning-showing range (L–N).
(L)   
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(M)   
(N)   
These examples help illustrate what Sperber and Wilson have in mind 
with these two distinctions between meaning and showing, and be-
tween determinate and indeterminate content.
4. Making manifest and sharing an impression
With determinate content the response a speaker intends to cause in 
the hearer is relatively straightforward. With the hat example (A) it 
was clear that the speaker wanted the hearer to remove his or her hat. 
With acts on the indeterminate side of the Sperber and Wilson con-
tinuum it is much less clear what is going on.
In their 1986 book Relevance: Communication and Cognition Sper-
ber and Wilson consider the following case, which is an instance of 
indeterminate content:
O: Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the 
window overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and osten-
sively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular good 
thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, fresher 
than it did in town, it reminds him of their previous holidays, 
he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fi sh; all sorts of pleasant 
things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was appre-
ciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have 
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intended him to notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be 
able to pin down her intentions any further. (1986: 55)
In this example Mary behaves in a way that makes it clear that she 
would like Peter to appreciate the seaside. It is not clear precisely what 
response she hopes to engender in Peter once he turns his attention 
to the seaside. If we attempted to spell out which Gricean response, r, 
Mary has in mind—be it that Peter come to accept some proposition 
as being true or to perform some action such as taking off a hat—we 
would fall short.
To address this Mary example1 Sperber and Wilson present their 
notion of sharing an impression. They write that if Mary were pressed 
on what she intended to convey to Peter “one of the best answers” would 
be that she wanted to share an impression. Cases such as O, where the 
speaker’s meaning is not determinate, cannot be paraphrased without 
loss (2015: 122).
We can map this notion of sharing an impression on the right side 
of the Sperber and Wilson plane:
When we express indeterminate content we share an expression.
Sharing an impression is contrasted with the notion of making 
manifest. When some content, p is shown or meant, this is the sort of 
thing that makes p more manifest on the Sperber and Wilson picture.
They write, “A proposition is manifest to an individual at a given 
time to the extent that he is likely to some positive degree to entertain 
it and accept it as true” (134). Manifestness is an epistemic notion. In 
their eyes, “the notion of mutual manifestness is more realistic, more 
psychologically relevant, and at least as cogent as the notions of mu-
tual knowledge, common knowledge, or common ground” (135). For 
something to be made manifest it must become salient to the hearer. 
‘Salience’ here is what they called ‘accessibility’ in Relevance (2015: 
133). In short,
Manifestness = epistemic strength + salience (2015: 133)
1 Unfortunately—and somewhat confusingly given the examples discussed 
here—Mary or Marie seems to be a popular choice for a female name in hypothetical 
scenarios; we have seen Mary and Marie already in cases D and E above. 
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Because manifestness is spelled out in terms of getting a particular 
proposition across this suggests that it only applies to those instance 
of meaning or showing that have fully determinate content. For how 
can a metaphor be made manifest? How can someone “believe or accept 
it as true” that Juliet is the sun? If manifestness is the sort of thing 
that can be applied only to utterances and behaviors with determinate 
content, then we see that manifestness applies to only a certain area 
of the plane, and on the opposite side from sharing an impression, as I 
have shown below.
5. Linguistic and non-linguistic content 
Having presented the Sperber and Wilson framework I will now turn 
to my proposed addition to it. In their paper, Sperber and Wilson write 
that ‘meaning that’ is “typically achieved by the use of language” (119). 
They do not say that use of language is a necessary or suffi cient condi-
tion for ‘meaning that’. However, all the examples Sperber and Wilson 
give in their schema of ‘meaning that’ are linguistic (Examples F, I, 
and L above). All the intermediary cases are both linguistic and non-
linguistic, pointing in conjunction with uttering (Examples G, J, and 
M above). And all the cases of ‘showing that’ are non-linguistic (H, K, 
and N above).
This could be taken to suggest that the distinction between showing 
that and meaning that is ultimately a distinction between expressing 
content linguistically and non-linguistically. We might wonder wheth-
er ‘displaying evidence that’ can be achieved by linguistic means and 
whether ‘meaning that’ can be achieved by non-linguistic means. What 
are the consequences of this for a theory of speaker meaning, if any? 
Despite their examples perfectly mapping on to a linguistic/non-lin-
guistic distinction in this way, it seems that Sperber and Wilson do not 
want us to understand ‘meaning that’ and ‘showing that’ as a contrast 
between linguistic and non-linguistic reasons. Again, they do not say 
that use of language is a necessary or suffi cient condition for ‘meaning 
that’, merely saying it is “typical” of ‘meaning that’.
If this is right, this suggests that there is another continuum be-
tween linguistic and non-linguistic cases of showing and meaning that 
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could be mapped onto the Sperber and Wilson framework as a third 
dimension. The resulting schema is what I call the Schema of Commu-
nicative Acts or SCA.
 Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA)
Having this as a third dimension could help to distinguish the contrast 
between meaning/showing from expressing content linguistically/non-
linguistically and better showcase the full range of possible cases of 
communication.
What we would want now that the new SCA framework is on the table 
is 27 cases, one for each point of intersection of the three variables. If 
this cannot be done it puts pressure on the idea that the meaning/show-
ing distinction is not tantamount to a distinction between linguistic 
and non-linguistic reasons for coming to act.
Schema of Communicative Acts With 27 Intersections
We can fi nd instances of determinate showing that are linguistic as 
well as non-linguistic (J, K).
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(J)   
(K)   
Likewise, we can fi nd determinate cases of meaning that are linguistic, 
as well as non-linguistic (L, M).
(L)   
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(M)   
I will not present 27 cases here but what I have begun indicates that 
it can be done for all 27 intersections. These examples across all three 
dimensions of the SCA point us away from concluding that the mean-
ing/showing distinction is a linguistic/non-linguistic distinction, as it 
may have appeared given the examples Sperber and Wilson provide. 
6. On showing
Once we have clarifi ed that the distinction between meaning and show-
ing isn’t tantamount to a distinction between linguistic and non-linguis-
tic content, another question arises, pertaining to what exactly is meant 
by ‘showing’. Showing is said to be “displaying evidence that” (2015: 
119). However, this only pushes the question back. What exactly counts 
as “displaying”? More to the point, how intentional must showing or 
displaying be, and must acts of showing follow the Sperber and Wilson 
two-pronged framework for ostensive-inferential communication?
In colloquial use, showing can be intentional or unintentional, as in 
“your undershirt is showing”. If showing is understood in the ordinary 
sense, it is safe to say that we often show things that are not relevant to 
the current situation. There certainly are things that are gotten across 
with utterances that might seem best classifi ed as perhaps uninten-
tional showing, or revealing, as with “I’m fi ne, Roy”. In other words, to 
put it in Sperber and Wilson’s terms, showing, as it is ordinarily under-
stood, does not seem to follow the presumption of relevance.
Taking ‘showing’ as something looser than a technical term that 
follows the presumption of relevance, it is clear that we sometimes 
show—or convey—things we 1) intend to conceal or 2) are unaware of 
revealing, as in M.
M. Let’s say that a man, Antonio, goes to the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art one day. He is given a pin that says ‘MET’ that he but-
tons onto his shirt. He later leaves the museum and rides the 
subway to Lincoln Center where he attends a performance of the 
New York Philharmonic Orchestra. Antonio sees a friend at the 
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concert and this friend says, “So, you went to the Met today?” 
Antonio replies, “How do you know?” 
At the moment when he saw his friend was Antonio showing that he 
had been to the Met that day? Was he displaying evidence that he had 
been to the Met that day? Do we need to know more about his mental 
state? In other words, does showing require an intention?
These questions are important because, with showing, there seems to 
be a tenuous link between a conscious intention on the part of the agent 
and what is communicated (that is, gotten across to an interlocutor).
Perhaps an issue at hand in assessing the Met case is one of tempo-
rality. It is almost impossible for one to produce an utterance without 
awareness that one is producing an utterance (although it is possible 
to construct limited cases). Because of this fact we can presume that 
a speaker has deemed any utterance to meet some intention now. It 
is this fact that leads to the presumption of relevance. However, with 
Antonio wearing the pin at the Met the matter is thornier. At the mo-
ment he put on the pin we might say he intended to show he had paid 
the admission fee. We might even say he had an intention that this 
information continue to be available to a viewer for the duration of his 
visit. Is such an intention required for showing?
Recall that on the Sperber and Wilson ostensive-inferential view, 
the utterer must intend the addressee,
 1) to produce a particular response r
 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)
Perhaps Sperber and Wilson wish to restrict their account of showing 
to those acts that satisfy these conditions. However, I believe that it is 
more constructive and has more explanatory power if we say that acts 
of showing need not meet these two conditions. Indeed, the best account 
of meaning and showing seems to be that meaning must satisfy these 
two conditions, but showing need not. The most explanatorily robust 
account of showing requires no intention on the part of the shower. In 
addition to what I see as the other benefi ts of this position, this account 
of showing, understood in a less restricted way, can account for more 
examples and more closely aligns with our colloquial use of the term.
Sperber and Wilson may reject this proposal and advocate instead for 
showing to be understood as a technical term that applies only to osten-
sive-inferential communication. If so, we need to know more about how 
to treat cases such as M. On my proposal, what we say about Antonio is 
straightforward: he is showing that he went to the Met all day, although 
he is not aware of showing for the majority of the time. If we limit show-
ing to ostensive-inferential communication that meets the two-pronged 
framework some other treatment of this case is needed. If we say that 
showing only applies to some early moment of the Met pin application, it 
seems very diffi cult to pinpoint when this would be, and why.
Showing in case M is a process with lasting effects. These effects may 
or may not be intentional. Or, if they were initially intentional, may not 
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still be intentional by the time they are interpreted. A complete account 
of showing would include an explanation of how much awareness on the 
part of the speaker is required for it to be a genuine case of showing.
7. Motivations
A further question that arises from this closer consideration of the 
showing-meaning continuum and the SCA more broadly is about speak-
er motivations. Why would someone choose to convey meaning in one 
coordinate or another? The decision to use linguistic or non-linguistic 
means is perhaps specifi c to situations. If I am in Croatia, I may hold 
up the letter 3 to order more glasses of wine for the table rather than 
speak, because I do not know the language. I may say “excuse me” loud-
ly to someone who is in my way but looking in the other direction. If I 
am a dancer or a visual artist, my work will be conveyed through non-
linguistic means because my training is on one side of this continuum.
The determinate vs. indeterminate continuum is about the nature 
of the content itself. If someone chooses to express indeterminate con-
tent—be it by a sniff at the seaside, a metaphor, a poem, or an abstract 
painting—this is about the message itself (or here range of messages). 
The decision to show or mean, via linguistic or non-linguistic means 
is a subsequent question about how to get that across. Recall that man-
ifestness, the successful outcome of expressing determinate content, is 
an explicitly epistemic notion, the extent to which, for any given propo-
sition, the interlocutor “is likely to some positive degree to entertain 
it and accept it as true” (Sperber and Wilson 2015: 134). Why would 
someone, on an occasion, choose to provide direct evidence of some fact 
rather than expect that their communicative intention alone would be 
enough to cause some response, r, in the hearer? The answer has to do 
with how they expect they will be interpreted.
Donald Davidson considers this point in his paper “A Nice Derange-
ment of Epitaphs”. He writes,
An interpreter has, at any moment of a speech transaction, what I persist in 
calling a theory…I assume that the interpreter’s theory has been adjusted 
to the evidence so far available to him: knowledge of the character, dress, 
role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by the speaker’s 
behavior, linguistic or otherwise. As the speaker speaks his piece the inter-
preter alters his theory. (2006: 260)
As Davidson writes, an interpreter decides how to interpret on the ba-
sis of assessing “character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and what-
ever else has been gained by the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or other-
wise” (2006: 260). As Davidson later notes, the speaker’s theory about 
the interpreter’s theory shapes how he chooses to attempt to convey his 
meaning.
I recently had a student who told me that she had to miss class 
because of jury duty. I said that was fi ne and that she should get the 
notes from another student. She later emailed me a photo of her jury 
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summons. I did not require extra evidence to believe that she had jury 
duty. However, she felt the need to show me direct evidence.
The fact that the student believed my recognition of her intention 
was insuffi cient for me to believe she had jury duty is likely the result 
of her having experienced a failure to achieve a certain result by such 
means in the past. Thus, learning from this experience, any rational 
communicator would move down the axis from meaning to showing.
That is, we might say that a speaker who chooses to provide direct 
evidence when his or her intention would be suffi cient has had their 
communicative behavior modifi ed by what has been called “testimonial 
injustice” (Fricker 2007)—when the interpreter’s “theory” (Davidson 
2006) “causes a hearer to give a defl ated level of credibility to a speak-
er’s word” (Fricker 2007: 1). Sperber and Wilson’s framework spells out 
of manifestness as an explicitly epistemic notion. This understanding of 
what we aim to achieve when expressing determinate content pushes 
us to consider the social factors that shape how a speaker would go 
about achieving their intended result. These social factors affect where 
an act will fall on the meaning-showing continuum.
8. Expression and affect
I began this paper by considering examples including ‘I’m fi ne, Roy’ 
and ‘I won’t swallow that’. Are we now in a position to resolve any of 
these confounding questions related to these utterances that I posed at 
the start? First it will helpful to map Sperber and Wilson’s notions of 
making manifest and sharing an impression onto the 3D continuum I 
have proposed.
What seems to be special about Marie uttering “I won’t swallow 
that” and Mary uttering “I’m fi ne, Roy” is that both speakers seem to 
be showing or revealing an emotional state that they are not aware of—
in the case of Marie in her therapist’s offi ce—or may be aware of but 
suppressing—in the case of Mary speaking to Roy. The propositional 
content Mary utters with “I’m fi ne” contradicts with what she shows 
by uttering “Roy”. To address what is going on such cases—and why 
they might be special—we must engage with work on consciousness 
and emotions from psychology and philosophy of mind.
There are a wide range of positions on the relationship between 
emotions, consciousness, affect, and utterances. Wittgenstein writes 
that if humans did not show outward signs of pain such as groaning or 
grimacing “it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 
‘tooth-ache’” (Wittgenstein 1958: 257). This account makes central the 
ways we show some of our internal bodily states.
This showing of external bodily states plays an important role in 
how we make hypotheses about the mental life of others. A psychothera-
pist may, for instance, make the assessment that a patient is in denial if 
they are laughing while describing the death of a parent (Jewett 1982).
Some theories of emotion place the subjective affective phenomenol-
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ogy—not its visible manifestation—at the center. Jesse Prinz has ar-
gued that emotions are what he calls “embodied appraisals” and that 
all emotions “potentially occur with feelings of bodily changes” (Prinz 
2006: 91). He is also explicit to note that on his view “all emotions can 
be conscious” (Prinz 2006: 91) but does not claim that all emotions must 
be conscious all the time (Prinz 2006: 201–202). Others defend the cog-
nitive view of emotions—that to be in a mental state such as fear, is 
to be consciously experiencing a perceived danger (LeDoux 2017: 303).
There is a wide variety of viewpoints on whether or not emotions 
must be conscious. Thus, to explain the Mary and Marie cases in terms 
of emotions would be to muddy the waters with a number of theoretical 
commitments on the very point we would like to clarity. We can instead 
talk in terms of affect, which “can designate the whole subject matter 
we are discussing here: emotions, moods, feelings” (Damasio 2000: 342). 
Such a move is an attempt to be agnostic as to the details of the theo-
retical commitments made by the philosophers of mind I appeal to here.
We must, however, be conscious of an affective state for us to verbal-
ly state as much. Philosopher of mind David Rosenthal (2006) writes, 
Suppose I am angry at you for doing a certain thing. If my anger is con-
scious, I might explicitly report the anger, by saying ‘I’m angry with you.’ 
Or I might express my anger nonverbally, say, by some facial expression or 
body language. … when I nonverbally express my anger, the anger may or 
may not be conscious ...when I say ‘I am angry’ I report my anger; I do not 
verbally express it.. (316)
Rosenthal here introduces a distinction between “reporting” affective 
states and “expressing” affective states. Reporting an affective state 
requires awareness of that state, where expressing that affective state 
does not require awareness of it.
Perhaps we have a similar distinction that can be made between the 
sorts of contents that are meant and those that are shown. We might 
extend Rosenthal’s account and conclude that although things that are 
meant must be conscious, those that are shown need not be.
Such a move would, however, require a reply to the sorts of ques-
tions I posed about the nature of showing earlier. If showing need al-
ways be intentional this move could not be made.
However, if such a move could be made, it could be brought back to 
deal with cases such as Marie and her mother. We could say that Marie 
showed that she ties her mother’s being overbearing to her eating dis-
order, consciously or subconsciously, but not that she meant this by her 
utterance. (The linguistic vs. non-linguistic addition I suggested clears 
the way for this; otherwise we cannot have linguistic showing).
We can map these two contents onto the SCA as follows:
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The bottom example is an instance of revealing an unconscious state. 
On this proposed model and understanding of showing, unconscious 
states may only be shown, and not meant. You cannot mean something 
you are unaware of meaning. You can show something you are un-
aware of showing.
Expression of affective states is diffi cult to suppress (Argyle 1975: 
111–112; Damasio 2000). Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes, “We 
are about as effective at stopping an emotion as we are at preventing 
a sneeze. We can try to prevent the expression of an emotion and we 
may succeed in part but not in full” (Damasio 2000: 49). If we think of 
certain utterances or parts of utterances as diffi cult to stop as sneezes, 
then they clearly do not follow the presumption of relevance.
Because of this the explanation for why we produce language that 
reveals affective states should be understood to be different from lan-
guage that is costly. To put it in Sperber and Wilson’s terms: the re-
vealing of affective states does not seem to follow the presumption of 
relevance.
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Not all utterances—or all parts of all utterances—are produced be-
cause of the intended effect on the hearer. Some of them are driven by 
affect. This awareness allows us to say something constructive about 
Mary and Marie from cases D and E. It also is the key piece to explain-
ing utterances that otherwise have no clear intended effect—such as 
ranting about a bad day or a recent comment by the president. Utter-
ances of this sort have their genesis more in the resulting effects on the 
speaker—not on the hearer—although a speaker may or may not be 
consciously aware of this. The continua of the SCA have provided the 
framework for the discussion of such complex utterances.
9. Metaphor
For my fi nal section I will return to consider the case of metaphor I 
posed at the start and see how it can be treated within the SCA. Sper-
ber and Wilson’s original (1986) example of sharing an impression was 
Mary sniffi ng ostensively on the seashore. This was an instance of in-
determinate meaning, and it is non-linguistic, and so will be slid back 
on the third proposed plane of the SCA.
‘Juliet is the sun’, an instance of linguistic indeterminate meaning, 
would fall into the following space on the proposed continuua:
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An utterance such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ is an instance of sharing an im-
pression because it cannot be paraphrased without loss of meaning—
Sperber and Wilson’s “test” for indeterminate content, borrowed from 
“the Romantics” (Wilson 2011).
Although I advocate for the modifi ed Sperber and Wilson framework 
and believe it is a powerful tool that can be used to helpfully map and 
analyze utterance types, this does not presuppose the Sperber and Wil-
son account of metaphor. Metaphors such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ have 
been seen as problems because on the Gricean account, for a speaker to 
have a meaning intention a speaker must have a complex three-pronged 
intention with respect to the response r they intend the speaker to have. 
With metaphor it is hard to imagine what this would look like.
Metaphors have been raised as a problem on this view because it 
seems improbable that a speaker who utters a metaphor has an inten-
tion that includes all the meanings we would want to say are expressed 
by a metaphor. As I posed rhetorically at the start, if a speaker does not 
have such an intention, on the Gricean view, in virtue of what can we 
say that an utterance containing a metaphor has such meaning?
Griceans have responded to the apparent quandary presented by 
the complexity of metaphors by 1) weakening the requisite intentions, 
2) oversimplifying their account of metaphors, or 3) positing dubious 
mental contents. This leaves one with the impression that there is some 
problematic ad hoc shifting taking place. Grice himself recognized the 
apparent problem for his view writing that some utterances may be un-
derstood as expressing an open disjunction of propositions (Grice 1989: 
40; 120). However, this seems to pose a problem for what sort of mental 
state this would require on the part of the speaker.
Sperber and Wilson’s account of metaphor is idiosyncratic in its own 
way. On the relevance theoretic picture, metaphors are on a continuum 
with hyperbole (Wilson 2011). Deirdre Wilson writes that ‘John is a 
giant’ “would count as hyperbole if taken to mean that John is very 
tall for a human” and would count as a metaphor “if taken to mean 
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that John stands out for other reasons than simply his height” (Wilson 
2011: 181). If it seems that the Sperber and Wilson account reduces 
metaphor to nothing special, that is because it does—explicitly. Sper-
ber and Wilson embrace this, writing in their “Defl ationary Account of 
Metaphors” that “there is no specifi c mechanism to metaphor, no inter-
esting generalization that applies only to them” (Sperber and Wilson 
2008: 84).
Instead, the relevance theory account of metaphor posits encyclope-
dic entries for concepts such as “giant” and “sleep” (Sperber and Wil-
son 2004; Wilson 2011). To interpret a metaphor is to choose amongst 
these encyclopedic entries. For example, to interpret a metaphor such 
as ‘The audience slept through the lecture’ involves choosing between 
sleep meaning to “a. become mentally disengaged, b. lose interest in 
one’s surroundings c. become motionless and unresponsive, d. gradu-
ally lose consciousness, e. undergo physical changes (snoring, slowed 
heart-rate, deep breathing, etc.)” (Wilson 2011: 188). It is not clear how 
this “encyclopedia entry” would come to be a part of a hearer’s mind, 
how discrete these categories are, or how it could work for all meta-
phors containing ‘sleep’, including novel ones.
Such accounts of metaphor fail to account for much of the richness 
of metaphor—albeit willingly on the part of Sperber and Wilson. Other 
accounts treat metaphor as something special and may seem more sat-
isfying because of this. For instance, in the work of Dick Moran (1989) 
metaphors are special in virtue of their “framing effects”. According to 
Moran, when we encounter a metaphor such as ‘Jack is a refrigerator’, 
we cannot help but conger up a mental picture that frames Jack in 
some way as a refrigerator. On the Moran view, these mental effects 
are akin to the way we can shift to “see an aspect”—viewing Wittgen-
stein’s duck-rabbit as a duck or a rabbit (Moran 1989: 89). To hear 
‘Jack is a refrigerator’ is to shift from viewing Jack as an ordinary man 
to “see an aspect” of him in some way as a refrigerator. As Elizabeth 
Camp (2017) has pointed out in later work on metaphors as insults, 
these framing effects may be the reason such statements are not fully 
cancellable.
To understand metaphor in terms of sharing an impression, on the 
right side of the SCA, is not to come down in favor of one theory of 
metaphor or another.
It is not clear whether or not Sperber and Wilson are attempting 
to revisit and revise their previously presented account of metaphor 
when they present it as sharing an impression. Based on what they 
argued in their 2008 and 2011 “defl ationary” accounts of metaphor it is 
diffi cult to see how metaphor is an instance of indeterminate content 
on their view. For, as argued by Wilson (2011) with the ‘sleep’ example 
metaphor does have determinate content, and we use the presumption 
of relevance to pick that content out from a fi nite number of encyclo-
pedic entries. On its face this view of metaphor is quite different from 
sharing an impression which does not have determinate content’ after 
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‘quite different from sharing an impression'. This may be an inconsis-
tency in what Sperber and Wilson have said about metaphor across 
different papers, or a misconstrual to be ironed out. If it is an inconsis-
tency we can stick with what they argue in the 2015 paper and perhaps 
understand metaphor in terms of an account that more resembles Mo-
ran’s framing.
Part of the apparent problem that metaphor presents for the Grice-
an seems to disappear when we stop seeing metaphor as expressing a 
range of propositions, and see it instead in terms of framing effects. 
It seems much more plausible that a speaker could have an intention 
to frame something in a way—Jack as a refrigerator—than that this 
speaker has a range of propositions in mind. To invite a hearer to pic-
ture this frame presents a nice parallel with Mary sniffi ng ostensively 
at the seashore.
Either way, although metaphor-qua-problem-case-for-Grice tends 
to be clustered in a certain part of the cube (top right), it is clear that 
the degree to which some intention is conscious is distinct from the 
meaning-showing, determinate-indeterminate, or linguistic-nonlin-
guistic continuua. Seeing this can allow us to disentangle questions 
about the degree to which some intention is conscious from where the 
corresponding utterance falls within the proposed quality space.
10. Conclusion
A full account of our communicative practices will be mindful of what 
these distinctions mean for 
1) our theories of meaning and
2) our explanations of why we engage in certain communicative 
acts, including showing.
The ability to handle a wide range of cases is a strength of the SCA. 
Sperber and Wilson’s work shows the power of applying philosophy of 
language grounded in Grice to an array of cases, and their 2015 frame-
work—which I hope to have strengthened—has great potential for 
theorizing not just about language, but about meaning-making, and 
the conscious and unconscious things we show, in general. Such work 
allows us to ask not only how but why we engage in certain forms of 
communicative behavior, and captures the incredible nuance of human 
interactions: said and meant, linguistic and non-linguistic, determi-
nate and indeterminate.
References
Argyle, M. 1975. Bodily Communication. International University Press.
Bezuidenhout, A. 2001. “Metaphor and What is Said: A Defense of a Di-
rect Expression View of Metaphor.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: 
156–186.
520 M. Johnson, Making Meaning Manifest
Camp, E. 2017. “Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presup-
position, and Pragmatics.” Philosophical Studies 174 (1): 47–64. 
Davidson, D. 2006. “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.” In E. Lepore and K. 
Ludvig (eds.). The Essential Davidson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the 
Making of Consciousness. New York: Mariner Books.
Fricker, M. 2006. Epistemic Injustice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Hornsby, J. 2000. “Feminism in Philosophy of Language.” In M. Fricker 
and J. Hornsby (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Phi-
losophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 87–106.
Johnson, M. 2016. “Cooperation with Multiple Audiences.” Croatian Jour-
nal of Philosophy 16 (47): 203–227.
Jewett, C. 1982. Helping Children Cope with Separation and Loss. Boston: 
The Harvard Common Press.
Kecskes, I. 2014. Intercultural Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
_____, 2016. “Intracultural Communication and Intercultural Communica-
tion: Are They Different?” Lecture. June 10, 2016. University of Split, 
Croatia. 7th International Conference on Intercultural Pragmatics and 
Communication.
LeDoux, J. 2017. “Semantics, Surplus Meaning, and the Science of 
Fear.” Trends in Cognitive Science 21 (5): 303–306.
Moran, R. 1989. “Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image, and Force.” Crit-
ical Inquiry 16 (1): 87–112.
Prinz, J. 2006. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. 2006. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Solomon, R. 2001. True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really 
Telling Us. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1986. Relevance: Communication and Cogni-
tion. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
_____, 2004. “Relevance Theory.” In L. Horn and G. Ward (eds.). The Hand-
book of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell: 607–632.
_____, 2015. “Beyond Speaker’s Meaning.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 
15 (44): 117–149.
Wilson, D. 2011. “Parallels and Differences in the treatment of metaphor 
in relevance theory and cognitive linguistics.” Intercultural Pragmatics 
8: 177–196.
Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
